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Abstract 
 
The Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill 2012 was introduced by the 
National-led Government to address a perceived public safety problem relating to 
recidivist sex offenders.  The Bill enables the detention of sex offenders beyond the 
expiration of their finite sentences, if they are seen as highly likely to reoffend.  As 
such, the Bill raises a number of serious human rights issues.  In response, the 
Attorney-General issued a statement contending the Bill was consistent with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  This article analyses the correctness of that 
statement, with a particular focus on whether the Bill is a form of civil committal and 
is, in substance, different to imprisonment.  Drawing on case law from the United 
States and Australia, where similar post-sentence detention schemes operate, this 
paper suggests the Bill actively engages with human rights concerns.  The conclusion 
reached is that the Bill appropriately balances the public safety interest and the basic 
human rights of sex offenders. 
 
Key words for Library Cataloguing: The Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill 
2012; post-sentence detention of sex offenders; civil commitment of sex offenders.  
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I Introduction 
 
On 29 August 2012, New Zealand’s most notorious sex offender, Stewart Murray 
Wilson, the so-called ‘Beast of Blenheim’, was released from prison.
1
  Wilson was 
convicted in 1996 of a host of heinous offences committed over twenty-five years, 
including seven counts of rape and charges of bestiality, indecent assault, ill treatment 
of children and stupefaction.
2
  Although Heron J thought preventive detention was 
appropriate, it could only be imposed in respect of a rape offence occurring after 1 
September 1993.
3
  It was not certain Wilson’s offending satisfied this requirement and 
Heron J was forced to impose a finite sentence of twenty-one years.
4
  When Wilson’s 
final release date approached, he had to be released, despite being assessed as highly 
likely to sexually reoffend and having been repeatedly denied parole on that basis.
 5
  
Wilson was released subject to various conditions imposed by the Parole Board until 
2015 and from thereafter, an extended supervision order (ESO).
6
 
 
Wilson, and other similar offenders, who are not sentenced to preventive detention, 
but who are evaluated as overwhelmingly likely to sexually re-offend at the end of 
their sentences, present a quandary for the New Zealand justice system.  Under the 
status quo, these offenders must be released and may be subject to similar restrictions 
as Wilson received.  However, these restrictions are seen by some as insufficient to 
protect the public from the serious harm posed by such offenders. To combat this 
perceived public safety issue, the National-led Government introduced the Public 
Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill (the Bill), to Parliament on 18 September 
2012.
7
  The Bill would enable the High Court to make a public protection order (PPO) 
                                                
1
 Anne-Marie Everson “‘Beast’ free, release plan still unclear” The Wanganui Chronicle (online ed, 
Wanganui, 29 August 2012).  
2 R v Wilson HC Wellington T-104-95, 15 March 1996 at 1-2. 
3 R v Wilson, above n 2, at 6-7. 
4
 At 6.  
5
 New Zealand Parole Board Wilson-Stewart Murray – Review of s 107 order under s 107(6) of the 
Parole Act 2002 (29 April 2011); New Zealand Parole Board Wilson-Stewart Murray – Review of s 107 
order under s 107(6) of the Parole Act 2002 (17 October 2011); New Zealand Parole Board Wilson-
Stewart Murray – Parole hearing under s 107(6) of the Parole Act 2002 (20 March 2012).  
6
 New Zealand Parole Board Wilson-Stewart Murray – Parole hearing under s 104(FRD) of the Parole 
Act 2002 (7 August 2012).  
7
 Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill 2012 (68-1) [Public Safety Bill]. 
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detaining an individual who has completed their finite sentence but poses a very high 
risk of reoffending.  
 
While there are sound policy reasons for the Bill, namely public protection, it raises 
serious human rights issues with regards to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA).  The National-led Government and the Attorney-General, the Hon 
Christopher Finlayson MP, have both issued statements to the effect that the Bill is 
NZBORA compliant.
8
  The purpose of this paper is to test the veracity of this claim. 
 
This discussion will proceed in three parts.  First, the conceptual foundations of the 
Bill, penal populism and public attitudes towards sex offenders, will be discussed.  
Second, the New Zealand case law and sources related to the human rights 
consistency of the Bill with NZBORA will be analysed.  These sources will then be 
compared to case law from the United States and Australia, both of which have 
similar post-sentence detention schemes for sex offenders.  The conclusion reached is 
that while the Bill does pose human rights concerns, it achieves an appropriate 
balance between human rights and public protection.  
 
II The Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill 2012 
A Purpose of the Bill 
 
The Bill is framed in terms of public protection rather than punishment.  The Bill 
explicitly disclaims that its objective is to punish former offenders.
9
  Instead, the 
established purpose is to protect the public from almost certain serious sexual or 
violent harm.
10
  A Government press release emphasises this point, stating, “detention 
would be protective rather than punitive”; “PPOs are… not criminal punishment”.
11
  
                                                
8
 Christopher Finlayson Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill – Consistency with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (14 October 2012) [Consistency with NZBORA]; New Zealand 
Government “Q+A – Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill” (press release, 18 September 2012) 
[Q+A]. 
9
 Public Safety Bill, cl 4.   
10
 Cl 4; explanatory note.  
11
 New Zealand Government “Q+A”, above n 8, at 2 and 4. 
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As such, one of the principles included in the Bill is that individuals subject to a PPO 
should have “as much autonomy and quality of life as possible”.
12
 
B Requirements for the Imposition of a PPO 
 
To be eligible for a PPO, an individual must be 18 years or older, detained under a 
determinate sentence for a serious sexual or violent offence and be within six months 
of his or her release.
13
  An individual subject to the most serious form of an ESO is 
also eligible.
14
  The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections can apply to 
the High Court for a PPO in respect of such individuals if there is a high risk of 
imminent serious sexual or violent offending.
15
  In the application, the Chief 
Executive must include at least two reports prepared by health assessors, including a 
registered psychologist, that address whether that risk exists and whether the 
individual exhibits a high level of four behavioural characteristics.
16
  These 
characteristics are specified in cl 13 as: 
 
(a) an intense urge to commit a particular form of offending; 
(b) limited self-regulatory capacity, evidenced by general impulsiveness, 
high emotional reactivity, and inability to cope with, or manage, stress 
and difficulties; 
(c) absence of understanding or concern for the impact of offending on 
actual or potential victims; 
(d) poor interpersonal relationships or social isolation or both.
17
 
 
The court can make a PPO if satisfied the individual meets the threshold and there is a 
very high risk of imminent serious sexual or violent offending.
18
  To do this, the court 
                                                
12
 Cl 5. 
13
 Cl 7. 
14
 Cl 7.  
15 Cl 8.   
16
 Cl 9.  
17
 Cl 13.  
18
 Cl 13.  
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must find the individual exhibits a severe disturbance in behavioural functioning, 
established by a high level of the above four characteristics.
19
 
 
Once issued, an established review panel frequently reviews a PPO.
20
  Additionally, 
within the first five years of a PPO, the court must review the continuing justification 
for the order, including the individual’s eligibility for release.
21
  An individual subject 
to a PPO can apply to the court to conduct such a review.
22
 
C Conditions of Detention under a PPO 
 
Individuals subject to a PPO, known as “residents”, are to be detained in a residence, 
a secure facility on prison grounds.
23
  Residents have the rights of individuals not 
subject to a PPO, except to the extent the Bill limits those rights.
24
  All residents are 
entitled to earnings from work, to vote, access the media and obtain a benefit.
25
  
Residents have the right to receive visits and written and oral communications from 
people outside the residence, although such visits and communications can be 
withheld or monitored.
26
  Residents also have the right to rehabilitative treatment.
27
  
While a resident’s rights can be limited, such decisions must be guided by 
reasonableness, proportionality and giving effect to the resident’s autonomy and 
quality of life.
28
  The Bill also makes provisions for searches of the resident and drug 
and alcohol tests.
29
  A resident can be placed in seclusion or restrained in strict 
circumstances.
30
 
 
When a resident begins their stay, the residence manager must, in consultation with 
the resident, assess their needs.  This must take into account the cultural or religious 
                                                
19
 Cl 13.  
20
 Cl 14.  
21 Cls 15 and 17.  
22 Cl 14.  
23
 Cls 3, 18 and 99.  
24
 Cl 24. 
25
 Cls 25, 27, 30, 34. 
26
 Cls 29, 31, 41-48.  
27 Cl 33. 
28
 Cl 24. 
29
 Cls 57-58. 
30
 Cls 61-62. 
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needs of the resident, the steps to be taken to facilitate their rehabilitation or 
reintegration into the community and the resident’s own aspirations for personal 
development.
31
  A management plan, based on this assessment, is then to be created, 
setting out factors including applicable treatment programmes, the nature and extent 
of supervision required and a programme contributing towards the resident’s release 
and reintegration.
32
 
D Prison Detention Orders 
 
On application by the Chief Executive of Corrections, the Court can order an 
individual subject to a PPO be detained in a prison instead of a residence.
33
  The 
Court can only do so if it is satisfied the individual would pose an unacceptably high 
risk to himself or others if detained in a residence and all other less restrictive options 
have been considered and appropriate options tried.
34
  An individual subject to a 
prison detention order (PDO) is to be treated as a prisoner awaiting trial and has all 
the rights conferred on residents by the Bill to the extent those rights are compatible 
with the applicable provisions of the Corrections Act 2004.
35
  As with PPOs, PDOs 
are subject to frequent review by the review panel and Court and an individual can 
apply to the Court for the cancellation of the order.
36
 
E Protective Supervision Orders 
If the Court is satisfied an individual no longer poses a high risk of imminent serious 
or sexual or violent offending, the Court must cancel the PPO and impose a protective 
supervision order (PSO).
37
  After five years, if an individual has not breached the PSO 
or reoffended in a serious way, the PSO can be cancelled.
38
 
 
III Conceptual Foundations of the Bill 
 
                                                
31
 Cl 38. 
32
 Cl 39. 
33
 Cl 72. 
34
 Cl 72.  
35 Cl 73.  
36
 Cls 74-79.  
37
 Cl 80. 
38
 Cl 89. 
The Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill 2012: Is Post-sentence Detention of Sex Offenders 
Consistent with Human Rights? 
 9 
The drastic measures imposed by the Bill can be properly understood as reflecting 
two concepts: penal populism and public attitudes towards sex offenders. 
A Penal Populism 
1 The theory 
 
Anthony Bottoms first identified the concept of populist punitiveness in 1995.
39
  Now 
better known as penal populism, it refers to the Anglo-American trend of public 
support for more punitive responses to criminal offending.
40
  This derives from 
disillusionment with the criminal justice system, embodied in the perception that the 
rights of criminals have been prioritised over their victims and the public.
41
  Penal 
populism signifies the shift in the influences on criminal justice policy from 
conventional voices, such as judges and academics, to the media and law and order 
lobby groups, who more accurately represent public opinion.
42
  Responding to this, 
political parties propose increasingly punitive laws to appease the public, sometimes 
resulting in a “law and order auction” where parties outbid each other to win pubic 
support.
43
   
 
In New Zealand, the late 1990s marked the start of the most recent shift towards penal 
populism.  John Pratt points towards three key factors that influenced this trend.  The 
first was the media, whose sensationalist reporting on criminal offending, 
mischaracterised crime and distorted public perceptions, creating a fear crime was 
increasing and the public becoming more vulnerable.
44
  The second factor was the 
1999 Law and Order Referendum, which asked whether there should be greater 
emphasis on the needs of victims and minimum sentences and hard labour for all 
                                                
39
 Anthony E. Bottoms “The philosophy and politics of punishment and sentencing” in Chris Clarkson 
and Rod Morgan (eds) The Politics of Sentencing Reform (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995).  
40 Wayne Martin “Popular Punitivism – the Role of the Courts in the Development of Criminal Justice 
Policies” (2010) 43 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 1 at 1.  
41
 Sandra Grey and Katie de Roo “When the next step is capital punishment what choices do we have: 
Penal reform movements in the age of penal populism” (2010) 25 New Zealand Sociology 38 at 41.  
42
 John Pratt “When Penal Populism Stops: Legitimacy, Scandal and the Power to Punish in New 
Zealand” (2008) 41 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 364 at 364. 
43
 Martin, above n 40, at 12; John Pratt and Marie Clark “Penal Populism in New Zealand” (2005) 7 
Punishment and Society 303 at 304.  
44
 Martin, above n 40, at 11; Pratt “When Penal Populism Stops”, above n 42, at 368. 
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serious violent offences.
45
  The referendum was overwhelmingly supported by 92% of 
the public, signalling the public wanted a more punitive approach to criminal justice.  
The emergence of penal populism was solidified by the 2001 formation of the law and 
order lobby group, the Sensible Sentencing Trust (SST).
46
  The SST quickly rose to 
prominence in the media and politics on a campaign of tougher sentences for violent 
offenders, based on protecting and upholding victims’ rights.
47
  It remains a popular 
voice today.  
2 Penal populism and the Fifth National Government 
 
The Fifth National Government has embraced penal populism over its last two terms 
in government.  Prior to the 2008 election, the crux of National’s law and order policy 
was “no parole for the worst repeat violent offenders”.
48
  The “two strikes, no 
walking” policy sought to prioritise the public’s right to safety and re-characterise 
parole as a privilege, not a right.
49
  This was given effect in 2010 with the 
implementation of the “three strikes” regime.
50
  “Three strikes” was originally an SST 
policy.
51
 
 
The regime limits judges’ discretion in sentencing repeat serious violent offenders.  
On a second strike, the judge must order the offender serve his or her sentence 
without parole and on a third strike, must impose the maximum term of imprisonment 
available and order that be served without parole, unless manifestly unjust.
52
  This is 
an example of penal populism because it demonstrates National responding to, as 
noted in the Regulatory Impact Statement, a “public concern” about repeat violent 
                                                
45
 “Referenda” (24 May 2013) The Electoral Commission <www.elections.org.nz>. 
46 Pratt “When Penal Populism Stops”, above n 42, at 371. 
47 Grey and de Roo, above n 41, at 46. 
48
 National Party Law and Order Policy: No Parole for the Worst Repeat Violent Offenders (6 October 
2008) <www.national.org.nz> at 1 [No Parole]. 
49
 National Party No Parole, above n 48, at 1.  
50
 Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010.  
51 David Garrett “One Weekend Four Murders! “Three Strikes” Law Would Save Lives” (press release, 
12 December 2007); Sophie Klinger “Three Strikes for New Zealand? Repeat Offenders and the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009” (2009) 15 Auckland U L Rev 248 at 248-249.  
52
 Sentencing Act 2002, ss 86C-86D. 
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offending.
53
  The scheme was designed to “enhance public confidence in the criminal 
justice system” by satisfying the public’s appetite for harsher punishment of these 
kinds of offenders, and in doing so, “improve public safety”.
54
 
 
Similar rhetoric was employed prior to the 2011 election, where National’s law and 
order policy focussed on “protecting the community” and “building a safer New 
Zealand.”
55
  One of the key election promises, which manifested itself as the present 
Bill, was to introduce a civil detention scheme for the country’s most high-risk 
offenders.
56
  This was somewhat reactionary to the scheduled upcoming release of 
Stewart Murray Wilson in 2012, who is a prime candidate for a PPO.  
3 Penal populism and the Bill 
 
As Wilson’s release date approached, the New Zealand public entered into a frenzy of 
fear and anger, especially in Whanganui where Wilson would be released.  Some 
members of the public expressed dissatisfaction with the law.  An opinion piece in 
The Rotorua Daily Post accurately captured this sentiment:
57
    
 
He doesn’t deserve to be let out. Unfortunately the law won’t allow that.  Now 
the community of Whanganui is suffering the impacts of a weak justice system 
that simply opens locked cell doors just because the sentence is over. 
 
This quote is the epitome of penal populism.  It advocates the hallmark convention of 
any Western justice system, that the mandatory release of an individual at the end of 
his or her sentence, is necessarily “weak”.  Unsurprisingly, there was extensive public 
support for retroactive legislation to keep Wilson in prison, such as the present Bill.
58
  
                                                
53 Ministry of Justice Regulatory Impact Statement: Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (2008) at 
1. 
54
 Ministry of Justice Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 53, at 1-3. 
55
 National Party Law and Order Policy: Protecting Communities (4 November 2011) 
<www.national.org.nz> at 1. 
56
 National, Protecting Communities, above n 55, at 7.  
57 Kelly Makiha “Editorial: Wilson should stay in prison” The Rotorua Daily Post (online ed, Rotorua, 
29 August 2012).  
58
 Michael Laws “Wanganui is right to resist Beast among us” The Wanganui Chronicle (online ed, 
Whanganui, 28 August 2012).  
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This included the Whanganui District Council, who passed a resolution to lobby for 
retrospective legislation.
59
 
 
The Council did little to assuage public fear and anger, and rather, much like the 
media, encouraged these to increase.  Despite Wilson being subject to the strictest 
release conditions ever imposed – seventeen separate conditions including GPS 
monitoring – Whanganui Mayor Annette Main questioned whether this was sufficient 
to keep residents safe.
60
  The District Council resolved to ban Wilson from all Council 
parks and other areas and to “coordinate a community shunning” of him by 
encouraging all business owners trespass him.
61
  The Council also brought a judicial 
review of the Parole Board’s decision to release Wilson to Whanganui, but were 
unsuccessful.
62
  Meanwhile, media reporting was fixated on Wilson and included 
sensationalist headlines such as “the Beast should never be freed” and assertions that 
Whanganui had become the Beast’s “new hunting ground”.
63
 
 
However, the strongest indicator of penal populism was the response from the 
opposition Labour Party.  Labour’s justice spokesperson, Charles Chauvel, refrained  
from challenging the premise of the Bill.  Instead, his criticism focussed on the 
Government’s delay in implementation, which had allowed one of the “targeted 
offenders” – Wilson – to be released.
64
  Given the mass public support for keeping 
Wilson in prison, it was politically untenable for Labour to dispute the necessity or 
merits of the Bill; playing into the “law and order auction”, Chauvel could only 
criticise the Government for not acting quickly enough.  This, and the public reaction 
to Wilson’s release, demonstrates penal populism remains a powerful force in New 
                                                
59
 Wanganui District Council “August 2012 Minutes” (16 August 2012) <www.wanganui.govt.nz> at 
3409. 
60 Kieran Campbell “Mayor has fears over ‘Beast’ release” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, 19 August 2012); New Zealand Parole Board Wilson-Stewart Murray – Parole hearing 
under s 104(FRD) of the Parole Act 2002, above n 6. 
61
 Wanganui District Council “August 2012 Minutes”, above n 59, at 3409; “Wanganui shop ban for 
Beast is back” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 24 August 2012). 
62
 Whanganui District Council v New Zealand Parole Board [2012] NZHC 2248. 
63 Bernadette Courtney “The Beast should never be freed” The Dominion Post (online ed, Wellington, 
18 April 2012); Laws “Wanganui is right to resist Beast among us”, above n 58.  
64
 Charles Chauvel “New law requires careful scrutiny, not political game playing” (18 September 
2012) The Labour Party <www.labour.org.nz>. 
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Zealand.  In particular, it explains why the Government proposed the Bill and why it 
enjoys public support.  
B Public Attitudes Towards Sex Offenders 
1 Common misconceptions regarding sex offenders 
 
The public attitude towards sex offenders is typified by a perception sex offenders are 
inherently different from other offenders.
65
   The reason for this is that sex offences 
create a moral panic, producing more public fear and anger than other crimes.
66
  
Consequently, sex offenders are the most stigmatised offenders in society and are 
despised even by other criminals.
67
  They are seen as the worst offenders and the 
types of punishment sex offenders ‘deserve’, such as registration and chemical 
castration, differ from other offenders.
68
 
 
Moreover, there is an inclination to view all sex offenders in an essentialist manner.  
Evidence does not support the view sex offenders are identical – offending differs in 
conduct, ranging from exhibitionism to rape and the motive for and underlying causes 
of offending are diverse.
69
  Nonetheless, sex offenders are grouped together and 
typically seen as predators, who prey on children or women, unknown to them, in a 
public place.
70
  This perception arises from the media portrayal of sex offenders, 
which is to focus on the worst instances of offending and report in a sensationalist 
way.
71
  In reality, while that type of offending does occur, the majority of sex 
                                                
65
 Brian K. Payne, Richard Tewksbury and Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustain “Attitudes about rehabilitating 
sex offenders: Demographic, victimization and community-level influences” (2010) 38 JCJ 580 at 582. 
66 Darrin L. Rogers and Christopher J. Ferguson “Punishment and Rehabilitation Attitudes toward Sex 
Offenders Versus Nonsexual Offenders” (2010) 20 Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma 395 
at 407. 
67
 Payne, Tewksbury and Mustain, above n 65, at 585; J Paul Fedoroff and Beverley Moran “Myths 
and misconceptions about sex offenders” (1997) 6 The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality 263 at 
263. 
68
 Rogers and Ferguson, above n 66, at 397. 
69
 Fedoroff and Moran, above n 67, at 275;  
70
 Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 65, at 586; James F. Quinn, Craig J. Forsyth and Carla 
Mullen-Quinn “Societal reaction to sex offenders: a review of the origins and results of the myths 
surrounding their crimes and treatment amenability” (2004) 25 Deviant Behaviour 215 at 216 and 218. 
71
 Jo Thakker “Public attitudes to sex offenders in New Zealand” (2012) 18 Journal of Sexual 
Aggression 149 at 151-152. 
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offenders are known to their victims, as a member of family or as a friend and the 
majority of offending takes place in or near to the victim’s home.
72
  
 
However, the most pervasive and worrying misconception is that sex offenders, as a 
group, are the most likely to reoffend.  It is commonly believed the rate of recidivism 
amongst sex offenders is substantially higher than other offenders.
73
  Many authors 
have held there is no conclusive evidence supporting this view and that instead the 
inverse is true.
74
  The public belief that sex offenders are highly likely to reoffend is 
underscored by a perception sex offenders cannot be cured.
75
  Theories have posited 
“sexual interests are imprinted on the brain in the same way as language” such that if 
an offender has a predilection to sexually offend, it cannot be changed.
76
   This has 
fostered a public attitude that treatment and rehabilitation programmes are futile and 
resources should instead be shifted towards the incapacitation of sex offenders.
77
  
While the efficacy of various treatment measures is yet to be properly ascertained, 
there is no decisive evidence sex offenders are incurable.
78
 
2  Application to the Bill 
 
Public perspectives of sex offenders are littered with myths and misconceptions.  In a 
2012 survey, Jo Thakker confirmed the existence of these attitudes in New Zealand.
79
 
Thakker reported only 10 per cent of those surveyed could identify recent legislative 
changes relating to sex offenders, specifically, the creation of ESOs and expanded use 
of preventive detention.
80
  These misconceptions undoubtedly contribute towards the 
public support for the Bill.  
 
The primary effect of the Bill is to detain sex offenders beyond the expiration of their 
prison sentences. There are three reasons why the public is in favour of such a 
                                                
72 Martin, above n 40, at 3; Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 65, at 586. 
73
 Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 65, at 585. 
74
 Thakker, above n 71, at 149; Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 65, at 585-586. 
75
 Quinn, Forsyth and Mullen-Quinn, above n 70, at 220. 
76
 Fedoroff and Moran, above n 67, at 270. 
77 Thakker, above n 71, at 160; Quinn, Forsyth and Mullen-Quinn, above n 70, at 218. 
78
 Thakker, above n 71, at 160. 
79
 Thakker, above n 71. 
80
 Thakker, above n 71, at 160. 
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scheme.  First, society doubts the efficacy of rehabilitation programmes and readily 
believes sex offenders will reoffend if released.  The Bill provides a pragmatic 
solution to this perceived problem, by preventing the worst sex offenders from being 
released, perhaps forever.  Second, the Bill indulges the public stigma surrounding 
sex offenders by taking a harsh approach toward them.  The New Zealand public 
wants these ‘predators’ to be ‘locked up’, which the Bill easy accomplishes.  Third, 
the belief that sex offenders are different to all other offenders necessitates a separate 
scheme to manage them, as provided by the Bill.  
 
The Wilson case exerts a large influence in this area.  The notion all sex offenders are 
predators is doubtlessly strengthened by Wilson, who exemplifies this stereotype, 
having preyed on vulnerable women and their daughters, who he lured into his home 
under the pretext of friendship.
81
  Wilson’s very nickname – the Beast of Blenheim – 
accentuates the predatory nature of his offending, as has the sensationalist media 
reporting on him, as documented above.  The case also lends credence to the belief 
sex offenders are incurable.  For the entirety of his eighteen-year sentence, Wilson 
refused treatment, showed no remorse and denied responsibility for his offending.
 82
 
As New Zealand’s most prolific sex offender, whose case has dominated news and 
print media, Wilson has come to be the public face of sex offenders in the country.  
Given the pervasiveness of Wilson’s case, it is unsurprising the public support the 
present Bill.  
 
IV    Consistency with NZBORA 
 
Conceptual understanding aside, it is important to analyse the practical effect of the 
Bill.  The Bill imposes further detention on offenders after the expiration of their 
finite sentence, based on their predicted likelihood to reoffend.  This very concept 
strikes at the heart of a number of Western legal traditions, most notably, an 
individual’s right to liberty.  For some, this concern may be lessened because the 
potential subjects of the Bill are sex offenders who have committed horrendous 
crimes.  However, human rights are of the most significance in respect of minorities, 
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whom the majority of the population dislikes.
83
  The strength of a legal system is 
often judged by the extent to which it protects the rights of those very people and 
therefore, the effect of the Bill on individual rights must be assessed.  
 
In New Zealand, that assessment must be made in the context of NZBORA.  
NZBORA is a statutory bill of rights, enacted with the dual purpose of affirming, 
protecting and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand 
and affirming New Zealand’s commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).
84
  Although, NZBORA is not supreme law, the Act contains 
the “notion of consistency with rights,” as established by the operation of s 6, which 
requires courts to prefer meanings of legislation consistent with NZBORA where 
possible.
85
  The Attorney-General is also required to report to Parliament, at the 
introduction of a Bill, if any provision appears inconsistent with NZBORA.
86
  New 
Zealand courts have often been called to determine challenges to legislation made on 
the basis it infringes a NZBORA right or freedom.
87
 
 
The Bill raises three obvious issues – whether detention under a PPO or PDO is 
arbitrary within the meaning of section 22; whether such detention imposes a 
retroactive penalty as prohibited per section 26(1) and whether that constitutes 
punishing an individual for the same offence twice (double jeopardy) per section 
26(2).
88
  For the Bill to be NZBORA compliant, detention under it must be construed 
as civil committal, rather than a form of punishment.  If it is punishment, then the 
detention will necessarily be arbitrary, impose a retroactive penalty and punish an 
individual for the same crime twice. 
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84
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In March 2012, Corrections released a Regulatory Impact Statement on the Bill.
89
  
This noted the risk PPOs could be construed as criminal, rather than civil orders, 
breaching the Government’s obligations in NZBORA and the ICCPR.
90
    
Nevertheless, Corrections recommended the scheme as the best of five options, 
including strengthening the ESO regime and creating a new continuing detention 
scheme.
91
  
 
After the Bill’s introduction, the Government maintained PPOs were a form of civil 
detention.  This focused on the purpose of the Bill, which is public protection, rather 
than punishment.
92
  Specifically, because the Bill provided for detention in a civil 
detention facility and allowed individuals a high degree of autonomy, the Government 
argued it appropriately balanced the competing rights at stake.
93
 
 
In October 2012, the Attorney-General issued a statement explaining why, in his 
opinion, the Bill was consistent with NZBORA.
94
  This unusual decision is the 
inverse of the NZBORA s 7 duty and has only occurred once previously when the 
Hon Margaret Wilson published her explanation of NZBORA consistency of the 
Foreshore and Seabed Bill.
95
  Mr Finlayson correctly held consistency with ss 22 and 
26 of NZBORA depended on whether PPOs imposed a further penal sentence or were 
permissible civil committal.
96
   He concluded the “distinct provisions at each stage of 
the making, administration and withdrawal of detention orders… are characteristic of 
a committal, rather than a penal, regime.”
97
  This was informed by the decision in 
Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, which he regarded as the 
leading case on the distinction between penal and civil measures.
98
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The discussion will now move to the primary purpose of analysing the validity of the 
Attorney-General’s claim that PPOs are a form of civil committal and NZBORA 
compliant.  The decision in Belcher will be considered, as well as case law from the 
United States and Australia.  
 
V   Is Post-Sentence Detention Civil or Penal in Nature? 
 
The essential question in determining whether the Bill is compliant with NZBORA is 
whether the detention imposed under the Bill is civil or penal in nature.  The first 
consideration must be the decision in Belcher, which was the primary basis for the 
Attorney-General’s argument such detention was civil.  
A Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections 
 
Belcher is a decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, heard by five permanent 
members of the Court.  The case concerned an appeal brought by Joseph Belcher in 
respect of an ESO imposed on him. Belcher challenged the ESO regime based on its 
alleged inconsistency with ss 22 and 26 of NZBORA.
99
  The Court resolved this 
question by considering whether an ESO amounted to punishment and unanimously 
held that it did.
100
 William Young P, giving the reasons of the Court, identified a 
number of factors supporting this conclusion.
101
  First, the event triggering an ESO 
was a criminal conviction and eligibility depended on an application before an 
offender’s sentence expired or while they were subject to release conditions.
102
  
Second, the consequences of an ESO were “in effect a subset of the sanctions which 
can be imposed on offenders”, including up to 12 months home detention.
103
  
Ultimately, it was thought the “imposition through the criminal justice system of 
significant restrictions (including detention) on offenders in response to criminal 
behaviour” amounted to punishment.
104
 
                                                
99
 Belcher, above n 87, at [24] and [27]. 
100
 At [35]-[36] and [49]. 
101 At [47]. 
102
 At [47]. 
103
 At [47]. 
104
 At [49]. 
The Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill 2012: Is Post-sentence Detention of Sex Offenders 
Consistent with Human Rights? 
 19 
 
The Attorney-General observed some of the Belcher factors applied to PPOs.  
Detention under the Bill has a strong link to prior offending: it is also triggered by a 
criminal conviction and the order must be applied for while an individual is nearing 
release or subject to an ESO.
105
  The restrictions the Bill imposes on an individual’s 
liberty are more extreme than ESOs and include “prison-like” conditions, such as 
seclusion and restraint.
106
  An individual is detained either in a residence on prison 
grounds, or as a last resort, in prison.
107
 
 
While these factors suggest the Bill can be construed as penal, Mr Finlayson 
considered other provisions negated this.  First, the requirement an individual 
“exhibits a severe disturbance in behavioural functioning” distinguishes it from ESOs 
and brings it in line with civil committal regimes.
108
   Second, the prison-like 
conditions of a PPO are mitigated by giving effect to the autonomy and quality of life 
of the individual.
109
   Third, the making of a PPO is “distinct from the penal and 
parole system” unlike ESOs, which are made by the court that imposed the sentence 
of imprisonment that triggered eligibility for an ESO.
110
  While the Attorney-General 
was correct in asserting the significance of the separation of the making PPOs from 
the penal system, his other two arguments are not as certain and require further 
attention.  
B Case Law from Comparable Jurisdictions 
 
While the decision in Belcher provides a starting point for analysing the Attorney-
General’s statement, there is a wealth of case law from other jurisdictions to be 
considered.  The United States and Australia are especially relevant as both have post-
sentence detention regimes for sex offenders, which raise similar human rights issues.  
National courts in both countries, and the Human Rights Committee of the United 
Nations (UNHRC), have adjudicated on the human rights consistency of the schemes.  
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In the absence of any direct New Zealand authority, these decisions provide valuable 
guidance.  Before these decisions are taken into account, a background history of the 
schemes will be provided. 
1 The United States 
 
The United States has a long history of civil committal for recidivist sex offenders, 
dating back to the 1930s.
111
  The current schemes were developed in the 1990s and 
focus on sex offenders seen as too dangerous to release.
112
  Washington was the first 
state to enact such legislation in 1990,
113
 which sparked a wave of similar legislation 
across various states.  Presently, twenty states have some form of post-sentence 
detention for sex offenders and in 2006 a federal detention programme was created.
114
 
 
In Kansas v Hendricks, the Supreme Court held by a majority of 5-4 that such laws 
were constitutional as a form of civil committal.
115
  The decision concerned the 
Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) enacted by Kansas in 1994, which enabled 
indefinite detention of sex offenders likely to engage in “predatory acts of sexual 
violence” because of a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder.”
116
  Leroy 
Hendricks argued the Act was unconstitutional on three grounds – it breached his 
“substantive” due process rights (right to liberty), amounted to double jeopardy and 
was ex post facto (retrospective) legislation.
117
  Thomas J gave the opinion for the 
majority, rejecting all three arguments.  The minority, in an opinion given by Breyer 
J, dissented with regard to the latter two arguments.  
 
Under the SVPA, an individual found be a sexually violent predator by the Court, is 
placed in the custody of the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitative Services for 
                                                
111 Eric Janus “Civil commitment as social control: managing the risk of sexual violence” in Mark 
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“control, care and treatment” until they no longer pose any danger.
118
  Such 
individuals may be detained by the Department of Corrections under an interagency 
agreement, meaning detention takes place in prison, although individuals are to be 
housed and managed separately from regular offenders.
119
  In practice, detention takes 
place in the psychiatric wing of a prison hospital, where individuals detained under 
the SVPA are treated in the same way as ordinary prisoners.
120
   
2 Australia 
 
Post-sentence detention legislation for sex offenders began in Australian in 2003 
when Queensland passed the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 
(DPSOA).
121
  Similar legislation has been passed in New South Wales,
122
 Victoria
123
 
and Western Australia.
124
  The DPSOA enables the court to order the indefinite 
detention of a prisoner considered a serious danger to the community.
125
  There must 
be an unacceptable risk the prisoner will commit a serious sexual offence if released, 
as demonstrated by evidence, to a high degree of probability.
126
  While subject to an 
order of indefinite detention, an individual is detained in prison and retains the status 
of a prisoner, even though their sentence has expired.
 127
 
 
The constitutionality of the DPSOA was challenged in Fardon v Attorney-General 
(Qld) in the High Court of Australia.
128
   Robert Fardon, detained under the DPSOA, 
argued the Act was unconstitutional because the function it conferred on the Supreme 
Court was incompatible with its position under the Constitution.
129
  The case turned 
on that narrow point and the majority of the Court, Kirby J dissenting, upheld the 
constitutionality of the DPSOA.  In his dissent, Kirby J discussed the human rights 
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implications of the Act and convincingly argues it is invalid.  The crux of his 
argument was that because the DPSOA allowed for continuing prison detention, it 
was clearly punitive and amounted to retroactively imposed double punishment.
130
 
 
In 2007, Fardon and Kenneth Tillman, an individual detained under the New South 
Wales equivalent legislation, submitted communications to the UNHRC under the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
131
  They alleged Australia had breached their right to 
be free from arbitrary detention and double jeopardy.
132
  The UNHRC found the 
continuing detention schemes breached these rights, as well as the prohibition of 
retroactive penalties.
133
  
 
VI   Mental Requirement for Civil Committal 
 
Returning to the Attorney-General’s statement, the first issue for consideration is the 
whether the Bill establishes a form of civil committal.  The Attorney-General believed 
that it did because of the cl 13 requirement that an individual exhibit a “severe 
disturbance in behavioural functioning”.  This is based on the traditional 
understanding of civil committal, which applies to individuals with some form of 
mental impairment. 
A New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand, civil committal of those with a mental disorder is provided for in the 
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (‘Mental Health 
Act’).  Mental disorder is defined as:
134
 
 
“An abnormal state of mind (whether of a continuous or an intermittent nature), 
characterised by delusions or by disorders of mood or perception or volition or 
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cognition, of such a degree that it poses a serious danger to the health or safety of 
that person or others; or seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take 
care of himself or herself.” 
 
Case law has indicated the definition purposefully avoids requiring a clinically 
diagnosed mental illness.
135
   
 
There is no mention of mental disorder in the Bill.  A Cabinet Paper states those 
detained under the Bill are unlikely to satisfy the requirements for civil committal 
under the Mental Health Act.
136
  This is an explicit recognition that the individuals 
whom PPOs are targeted at fall outside the existing scope of civil committal in New 
Zealand.  This acknowledgment is of crucial importance for the Bill.  If the Bill is to 
be construed as civil, it means the threshold for civil committal in New Zealand is 
necessarily being widened.    
B The United States 
 
This issue was also confronted in Hendricks, where a “mental abnormality or 
personality disorder” was required by the SVPA. Hendricks argued the SVPA was 
invalid because this lowered the traditional threshold for civil committal – a mental 
illness.
137
  Thomas J recognised a finding of dangerousness alone was insufficient for 
civil committal; an “additional factor” such as mental illness was required.
138
  This 
served the purpose of limiting committal to individuals “who suffer from a volitional 
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control”.
139
  In the majority’s 
opinion, a “mental abnormality or personality disorder” sufficed as the “additional 
factor”, because it would mean offenders were unable to control their 
dangerousness.
140
  The minority concurred with the Court on this point, 
141
 which was 
later affirmed in Kansas v Crane.
142
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This was problematic because Kansas Legislature expressly acknowledged the SVPA 
applied to sex offenders “who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders 
them appropriate for involuntary treatment” under Kansas’ general civil committal 
statute.
143
  Hendricks too, then, lowers the standard for civil committal. 
C Is the threshold too low? 
 
The decision in Hendricks has been the subject of intense scrutiny.  Many mental 
health professionals believe it unacceptably widens the threshold for civil 
committal.
144
  Critics observe that while the meaning of mental illness is clear, with 
definitions, guidelines and evidentiary standards, “mental abnormality” is a legislative 
construct without the same characteristics.
145
  Kennedy J, concurring with the 
majority in Hendricks, recognised this concern, stating the SPVA would be 
unconstitutional “if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category 
to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified”.
146
 
 
The Bill is vulnerable to the same critique.  While a mental illness is not required in 
for civil committal in New Zealand, the Mental Health Act is clear as to what level of 
mental disorder is needed.  This is a lower threshold than that applicable in the United 
States, and the Bill further reduces it.   This casts the net for civil commitment far too 
widely.  Research demonstrates the majority of prisoners suffer from some sort of 
antisocial personality disorder and would satisfy requirements such as a “mental 
abnormality” or “severe disturbance in behavioural functioning”.
147
  For example, a 
New Zealand study revealed 59.6% of prisoners had at least one verified personality 
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disorder diagnosis.
148
  This suggests a large percentage of the prison population could 
be caught by the lower mental standard required by the Bill.  This is inherently 
problematic when the purpose of the requirement is to limit those eligible for civil 
committal and prevent individuals being detained on dangerousness alone.
149
 
 
This suggests the Attorney-General and the court in Hendricks are wrong to conclude 
something less than the existing standard suffices to make the respective schemes 
forms of civil committal.  If that is the case, it becomes easy to construe the schemes 
as merely a tool for the legislature to detain those it identifies as dangerous.  Breyer J, 
dissenting in Hendricks, noted this concern.
150
  That is troubling because 
dangerousness is tenuous basis for imprisonment, being based on predictions of future 
offending, which may never eventuate.  Kirby J, dissenting in Fardon, regarded 
predictions of dangerousness as unreliable because they were often over predicted by 
psychiatrists and ultimately, only an “educated guess”.
151
  The UNHRC echoed this 
sentiment, stating dangerousness is an “inherently problematic” concept for similar 
reasons.
152
 
D Concluding Remarks 
 
The mental requirement in cl 13 does not conclusively establish the Bill is civil 
committal, contrary to the Attorney-General’s assertion.  However, it is important that 
the Bill, like the SVPA, includes some form of mental requirement.  This contrasts 
with the schemes operating in Australia.  For example, Queensland’s DPSOA while 
requiring psychiatric evidence to be considered, does not require a finding of any sort 
of mental condition.
153
  Kirby J was especially concerned by th]is major departure 
from the established principles of civil commitment in Australia and accordingly 
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rejected the DPSOA as a form of civil committal.
154
  The Attorney-General’s 
argument the Bill is civil in nature, is at least in that respect, more credible than its 
Australian counterparts. 
 
VII  Detention and Imprisonment 
 
The Attorney-General’s second reason in deciding detention under the Bill was civil 
was that its provisions give meaningful effect to the autonomy and quality of life of 
individuals.  This nuanced argument contradicts the more obvious response that 
detention in a prison or a secure facility on prison grounds is the classic example of 
punishment, as suggested by theories of punishment.  
A Theories of Punishment  
 
The standard definition of punishment, developed by H.L.A. Hart comprises five 
elements.
155
  Specifically, punishment:
156
 
 
(a) must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant; 
(b) must be for an offence against legal rules; 
(c) must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence; 
(d) must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender; 
(e) must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system 
against which the offence is committed. 
 
Joel Feinberg accepted this definition, adding the qualification that punishment must 
serve an expressive function.
157
   Feinberg’s thesis was that, in addition to involving 
“hard treatment” (“pain or other consequences”), punishment expresses resentment, 
indignation and the judgments of disapproval and reprobation.
158
   According to 
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Feinberg, these elements of punishment need not be distinct.  The “hard treatment” an 
offender is subjected to may also express disapproval.
159
  In particular, Feinberg 
considered certain forms of hard treatment, such as incarceration, have become 
entrenched as typical expressions of reprobation.
160
  Applied to the Bill, detention in a 
secure facility on prison grounds or in prison satisfies the formalistic and expressive 
requirements of punishment.  Thus, according to theory, the Bill and other post-
sentence detention schemes are straightforward examples of punishment.   
 
Courts have attempted to circumvent this issue by focussing on the purpose of 
detention.  While incapacitation is a common purpose of civil committal and 
imprisonment, retribution and deterrence are purposes of only imprisonment.  
According to retributive theorists, the foundation for imposing punishment is that the 
offender deserves to be punished because they have committed a crime.
161
  This 
includes an element of proportionality – offenders should be punished according to 
their culpability and the seriousness of their offence.
162
  In Hendricks, the majority 
found no retributive purpose in the SVPA because it “did not affix culpability for 
prior criminal conduct.”
163
  Instead, the prior offending was only evidence used to 
support a finding of dangerousness or the existence of mental abnormality or 
personality disorder.
164
  Another reason the schemes are not retributive, as per 
Callinan and Heydon JJ in Fardon, is that their purpose is not to impose detention on 
individuals who deserve punishment, but rather to protect the public.
165
   
 
Deterrence encompasses the idea that punishment has a crime-preventive 
consequence,
166
 by acting as a disincentive for criminal offending.
167
  This applies at a 
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specific level, in terms of the individual offender, and at a general level, in terms of 
other would-be offenders.
168
  In Hendricks, the Court rejected any deterrent purpose, 
because the Act applied to offenders with no control over their actions (due to a 
mental abnormality or a personality disorder), who would not be deterred by the threat 
of confinement.
169
  This argument is plausible; theory posits deterrence is necessarily 
limited by the extent to which the targeted offender or would-be offenders consider 
the risk of punishment rationally.
170
  In particular, deterrence is ineffective where the 
targeted offenders suffer from a mental condition that affects their ability to obey the 
law.
171
 
 
In Hendricks, having rejected the applicability of the “two primary objectives of 
criminal punishment”, the majority deferred to the Kansas Legislature’s framing of 
the SVPA as civil.
172
  This approach can be applied to the Bill.  Cls 4 and 5 explicitly 
disclaim any retributive purpose and for the reasons enunciated by the majority in 
Hendricks, a deterrent purpose is inapplicable.  Therefore, there is a case for accepting 
the Government’s framing of the Bill as civil.  
 
However, the decision in Belcher precludes this analysis.  The Court held it was “not 
decisive that the aim of the ESO scheme is to reduce offending… as opposed to the 
direct sanctioning of the offender for the purposes of denunciation, deterrence or 
holding to account.”
173
  Many criminal law sanctions, such as preventive detention 
and supervision, have a similar aim but are still considered penalties.
174
 This 
conclusion is supported by various academics including Patrick Keyzer, who 
unequivocally states “prison does not stop being punitive because the parliaments or 
courts characterise the purpose of imprisonment as non-punitive.”
175
  Therefore, in 
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New Zealand, an argument the Bill is civil because its purpose is protective or non-
punitive is unlikely to succeed. 
 
This approach is superior to that in Hendricks.  The majority’s decision to uphold the 
SVPA as civil based on the purpose of detention being non-punitive was flawed.  It 
ignores the larger issue at stake – that an individual is being detained in a prison 
hospital, with other prisoners, potentially indefinitely, after his or her sentence has 
expired.  It is hollow to contend this is not punitive, solely because its alleged purpose 
is not retribution or deterrence.  If the detention amounts to punishment in substance, 
its purpose should not matter.  Furthermore, the finding the SVPA had no retributive 
purpose was artificial at best.  It is plausible it does serve a retributive purpose – to 
imprison sex offenders who ‘deserve’ to be ‘locked up’ based on their past crimes.  
This punitive intent was certainly reflected in statements of the Attorney General for 
Kansas who stated, “we cannot open our prison doors and let these animals back into 
the community”.  The majority should have taken a more rigorous approach, such as 
the Court in Belcher, rather than deferring to the Kansas legislature’s framing of the 
SVPA as civil.  
B Substantive Analysis of Detention under the Bill 
 
Breyer J, for the Hendricks’ minority, took this approach and focussed on how the 
SVPA operated in practice.  He noted detention under the SVPA was similar to 
imprisonment; it was “secure confinement… against one’s will”.
 176
   This, combined 
with the location of detention, meant it could be construed as punishment.
177
  The 
Attorney-General correctly followed this approach, but reached the opposite 
conclusion, holding that the “prison-like conditions” of detention under the Bill, 
which appeared punitive in substance, were displaced by the focus on the individual’s 
autonomy and rights.
178
  
 
To evaluate this argument it is important to distinguish between PPOs and PDOs, the 
Attorney-General’s argument being more persuasive with regards to the former.  PPO 
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detainees will live in a residence on prison grounds, completely separate from existing 
prisoners.  They are entitled to rights prisoners are not, such as the right to vote and 
obtain a benefit.  Individuals are to have as much autonomy and quality of life as 
possible, while providing for security concerns.  This means residents will be able to 
have a more normal, functioning daily life than prisoners.  In substance, detention 
under a PPO is different to imprisonment and is not penal in nature. 
 
However, the same cannot be said with regards to PDOs.  Although only imposed as a 
last resort, PDOs require detention in a prison.  Individuals are to be treated as a 
prisoner awaiting trial (a remand prisoner), with the same rights entitlements as those 
subject to a PPO, to the extent that the rights are consistent with the Corrections Act.  
Many of the rights entitlements of those subject to a PPO have an equivalent 
provision in the Corrections Act: there are provisions for individuals to work;
179
 have 
reasonable access to the news;
180
 receive visitors;
181
 and receive mail and make 
telephone calls,
182
 subject to some degree of monitoring.
183
   However, the Act also 
imposes a variety of restrictions, such that the rights it confers are not as meaningful 
as the Bill.
184
   The focus is not on the autonomy and quality of life of the individual, 
but rather on ensuring prisoners’ minimum entitlements are met.
185
  Most 
fundamentally, an individual subject to a PDO is kept within the confines of a prison 
and their day-to-day life mirrors that of a regular prisoner.  
 
The distinguishing status of individuals subject to PDOs as remand, rather than 
sentenced, prisoners is of little practical difference.  There is no distinction in the 
rights entitlement between classes of prisoners, barring that remand prisoners are 
allowed to vote.
186
  However, remand prisoners are housed separately from sentenced 
prisoners and are generally permitted to wear their own clothing while in prison.
187
  
These differences are negligible.  Wearing different clothing or being housed in a 
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separate area within a prison, does not change the fact such individuals live under the 
same conditions as prisoners, imposed on them by the same administration.  Their 
liberty is restrained in the exact same way.  Therefore, the detention of individuals 
under a PDO can be construed as imprisonment and punitive in nature.  This is 
consistent with the findings of the UNHRC which emphasise that “prison is penal in 
character.”
188
 
 
VIII Implications for the Bill 
 
It is clear the Bill has implications for compliance with human rights standards.  
There are two particular issues – what mental requirement is needed for civil 
committal and whether detention under the Bill is, in substance, punishment. 
 
It could be argued the Bill is an example of penal populism, where the Government, 
sensing the outrage in response to Wilson’s pending release, acted to pass a Bill it 
knew would garner public support.  The public’s attitude towards offenders has 
become increasingly punitive, and the National-led Government has responded to this 
in the past, both in its electoral campaigns and in the “three strikes” regime.  This 
suggestion is also strengthened by the common misconceptions the public has 
regarding sex offenders, such as their inability to be rehabilitated.  If this were the 
case, the Bill would be a worrying example of the tyranny of the majority, perpetuated 
over the unpopular minority of sex offenders. 
 
However, it would be wrong to characterise the Bill in such a way.  Its provisions 
plainly demonstrate the Government has engaged with NZBORA concerns and tried 
to reduce inconsistencies.  The inclusion of some form of mental requirement to 
trigger the application of the Bill demonstrates New Zealand has learnt from the 
Australian equivalent statutes, which contain no requirement.  Even though the Bill 
widens the threshold for civil committing by deviating from the standard in the 
Mental Health Act, it does not so as dramatically in the various state schemes in the 
United States.  In Kansas, the SVPA lowers the standard for civil committal from a 
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mental illness to a “mental abnormality or personality disorder” and has been subject 
to much criticism on this basis. 
 
The Government must also be given credit for developing a completely separate 
scheme of detention for PPOs.  This ensures such detention is not substantively the 
same as imprisonment.  However, questions remain with respect to whether PDOs are 
substantively different from imprisonment; this paper suggests they are not.  PDOs 
are closer to the United States and Australian schemes where those detained are 
treated the same as existing prisoners.  A redeeming factor for the Bill is that PDOs 
are not envisaged as the norm and only imposed as a last resort, when all other less 
restrictive options have been considered or tried.
189
  This contrasts to the United 
States and Australian schemes, which do not require the consideration of less 
restrictive alternatives.  Breyer J, dissenting in Hendricks, criticised the SVPA for not 
requiring consideration of post-release supervision or halfway houses.
190
  Likewise, 
the UNHRC held Australia should have demonstrated why “less intrusive” means 
than continuing imprisonment were insufficient to manage Fardon.
191
   
 
A regime providing for the post-sentence detention of sex offenders could be far more 
offensive to human rights than the contemplated Bill.  The Australian equivalent 
schemes with no mental requirement and continued prison detention embody the 
worst possible option. The callousness of the Australian attitude was demonstrated by 
the Government’s decision to ignore the UNHRC’s findings that it had breached 
multiple Articles of the ICCPR.
192
  Fardon continues to be detained in prison.  While 
there are some concerns with the Bill, they do not demonstrate such a blatant 
disregard for human rights.   
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IX   Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the validity of the Attorney-General’s claim 
that the Public Safety (Public Protection Order) Bill is consistent with human rights.  
At first glance, the concept of the Bill – the detention of sex-offenders beyond their 
finite sentences – suggested it would compromise core rights protected in NZBORA.  
However, on closer inspection, it is clear the Bill has been drafted to engage with and 
lessen these concerns.  The Attorney-General argued the Bill was a form of civil 
committal and that the detention it imposed was different to imprisonment.  For the 
most part, these arguments are correct.  However, the Attorney-General’s analysis 
could have been more thorough with regard to the lowering of the threshold for civil 
committal and detention under PDOs, as discussed in this paper.  On the whole, and in 
comparison to the schemes operating in the United States and Australia, the Bill 
strikes an appropriate balance between the competing interests at stake – public 
protection and human rights. 
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